[Analytics] Making US–Cambodia relations great again

Since the new US Ambassador to Cambodia W Patrick Murphy presented his credentials to Cambodian King Norodom Sihamoni on 19 October 2019, a number of developments have unfolded that indicate a potential diplomatic rapprochement between the two countries. Ambassador Murphy met with Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen on 23 October and, two days later, Hun Sen advised cabinet officials to reinvigorate ties with Washington. Chansambath Bong specially for the East Asia Forum.

It may be too early to judge whether Hun Sen genuinely wants to improve relations with the United States, but his recent manoeuvring is noteworthy. Just two years ago Hun Sen accused Washington of colluding with the now banned Cambodia National Rescue Party (CNRP) against his government.

On 10 November 2019, CNRP co-founder Kem Sokha was released from political house arrest. Sokha’s release may be viewed as an effort by the Hun Sen government to divert attention from CNRP party leader Sam Rainsy’s attempt to return to Cambodia after fleeing and the EU’s preliminary investigation into terminating Cambodia’s ‘everything-but-arms’ privileged trade status. But this event should also be viewed in the context of US–Cambodia relations, which deteriorated partly due to Sokha’s political arrest in September 2017.

Three days after Sokha’s release, Murphy met with Cambodian Minister of National Defense General Tea Banh to discuss revitalising military cooperation with an emphasis on joint exercises — halted since 2017 — and allowing US naval vessels to resume docking on the Cambodian coast. The Cambodian government also agreed to allow the Voice of America radio station to restart its broadcasting in the country after it was forced to close in 2017.

Hun Sen had his second meeting with Murphy less than a month after the first. The US envoy reportedly delivered two letters from US President Donald Trump. The first was an invitation to the special US–ASEAN Summit in 2020 and the second emphasised the significance of bilateral ties by affirming that US officials ‘do not seek regime change’ in Cambodia. Hun Sen enthusiastically applauded Trump’s summit initiative, noting that the meeting will enhance ties between ASEAN and the United States. He also endorsed the initiative of creating working groups to restore ‘trust and confidence’ between the two nations.

Conciliatory gestures made by Cambodia and the United States over the past month indicate an intentional move towards a détente by both sides. But it is too early to judge if and how long this rapprochement will continue. It is uncertain whether this is Hun Sen’s short-term strategy to ease Western pressure or whether he is concerned about the risk of Cambodian overdependence on China and wants to mend relations with the United States in order to put the country in a more balanced position.

Meanwhile, the United States has not fleshed out any major policy changes since Murphy’s arrival. It goes without saying that Murphy’s appointment — one of the most senior Southeast Asia experts at the State Department — is itself an indication of Washington’s increased attention on Cambodia.

The current rapprochement can be viewed as a result of increasing concern on both sides. Cambodia’s growing ties with China have created a number of domestic issues such as an increase in criminal activities committed by Chinese nationals, corruption and growing Sinophobia. Cambodia’s diplomatic credentials also suffered greatly after the 2012 ASEAN Summit and the first ever failure to release a joint communique. This led to allegations that Cambodia was turning into a Chinese military outpost, that Cambodian foreign policy is ‘an extension of Chinese foreign policy’ and that Cambodia is a ‘Chinese client state’.

Meanwhile, the Trump administration’s hardline approach had pushed Hun Sen closer to China. Washington should be reminded that Cambodia–China ties remain strong amid Western pressure and that Hun Sen is willing to risk deteriorating ties with the United States in order to secure an election victory, as he has done in the past. As Beijing’s influence continues to encroach on Cambodia, Washington should rethink its approach if it wants to prevent a ‘counter-hegemonic’ power like China from filling the vacuum.

The upward trajectory in US–Cambodia relations will depend on four key factors.

First, there are three sanction bills being considered by US Congress. If passed and signed into law, these bills will impose asset freezes and visa sanctions on senior Cambodian officials and there will be a review of Cambodia’s Generalized System of Preferences status. From recent exchanges between Hun Sen and Trump, the possibility of passing these bills anytime soon appears unlikely. Trump may not want to muddy the waters immediately after Hun Sen accepted his invitation to the 2020 US–ASEAN Summit. Passing these bills would be viewed as US political interference by Phnom Penh and Hun Sen’s inner circle, who have great influence on his foreign policy and may fear appearing on the US sanctions list. That said, sanctions imposed under the Global Magnitsky Act remains a possibility, as indicated in recent cases made against prominent businessman Try Pheap and General Kun Kim, both of whom part of the administration’s patronage machine.

Second, Phnom Penh will likely be cautious about its rapprochement with Washington in order to avoid antagonising its most vital political and economic ally in Beijing. This is particularly the case as the United States and China are locked into strategic competition in Asia.

Third, although the 2020 US–ASEAN meeting is a multilateral summit, it can positively affect Hun Sen’s impression of the United States’ commitment to Southeast Asia.

The last key factor is domestic politics. Although Kem Sokha has been released from house arrest, restrictions on his political rights remain a major roadblock to long term US–Cambodia rapprochement.

Whether Cambodia and the United States can resume friendly relations remains unclear. Although recent conciliatory gestures made by both sides suggest a trend towards rapprochement, major foreign policy changes by either side remain limited.

Chansambath Bong is a J William Fulbright Foreign Student Fellow and MA candidate in Security Studies at Kansas State University.