[Analytics] The return of old-style Malay-centric politics?

As the world was gradually coming to terms with COVID-19, Malaysia was enveloped by a self-manufactured political crisis. Uncertainty prevailed over who wielded ultimate executive power in light of the abrupt resignation of Mahathir Mohamad. The Yang di-Pertuan Agong — Malaysia’s king — eventually settled on Muhyiddin Yassin as the best choice to lead the country as Malaysia’s eighth prime minister. Ahmad Fauzi Abdul Hamid specially for the East Asia Forum.

A 72-year old former chief minister of Malaysia’s southernmost state of Johor, Muhyiddin was the candidate the King saw as most likely to command a majority of support from elected parliamentarians in the House of Representatives. Surrounding his selection were worries about the true level of support for Muhyiddin amid challenges by two other contenders — Anwar Ibrahim and Mahathir himself.

Mahathir and Anwar paid the price for vacillating on who should lead a reconfigured Pakatan Harapan (PH) coalition while still reeling from the betrayal of MPs from PH’s component parties — the Anwar-led People’s Justice Party (PKR) and the Malaysian United Indigenous Party (Bersatu), of which Muhyiddin is president and Mahathir is chairman.

A simplistic explanation for these bizarre political events would be to cry ‘betrayal’ at the several obvious turncoats — Muhyiddin and PKR Deputy President Azmin Ali who defected along with 10 other PKR MPs to Bersatu. Their Bersatu membership was originally received by Mahathir, who was also nominated during the final moments of horse-trading by PH as its prime ministerial hopeful — a stance it soon withdrew.

Muhyiddin’s Bersatu faction collaborated with MPs from the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO), the Pan-Islamic Party of Malaysia, the Sarawak Parties Coalition, the Malaysian Chinese Association and the Malaysian Indian Congress in forming a new ruling coalition called the Perikatan Nasional.

Oversimplifying matters by reducing the crisis to a battle ‘for or against’ a ‘New Malaysia’ — a political vision for Malaysia’s future supposedly represented by PH — neglects the dynamics of Malay-Muslim politics.

Muhyiddin’s principal private secretary Marzuki Mohamad spoke clearly of a perennial clash in intra-Malay politics between conservative and liberal forces. While it is true that socio-political and religious conservatism has long been entrenched in Malay-Muslim society through decades of UMNO hegemony largely built upon a patronage system in rural areas, reform-oriented politics is captivating an increasingly large proportion of Malay-Muslims.

Reformasi (reformation) has been the clarion call of at least one generation of Malay-Muslim activists buoyed by the vision of a more socially diverse, economically fair and religiously tolerant Malaysia grounded on inclusive Islamic principles. For these coteries of Malay-Muslims, there is increasing recognition that the UMNO-driven political–economic formula of affirmative action and positive discrimination gave rise to discontent — not only among non-Malays but also among Malays themselves.

This new path dependency is one that remains broadly loyal to Malaysia’s Malay-cum-Islamic ethos as represented in the constitutional clauses respecting the positions of Islam, Malay rulers and indigenous communities. But such primacy does not, in the new Malays’ minds, necessarily translate to UMNO-style institutional racialism.

A cursory look at Malay-Muslim politics might lead one to equate this new Malay-Islamic ethos with Anwar Ibrahim. But he is far from indispensable to it. Even with Anwar in jail, a new progressive trajectory of Malay-Muslim politics was continued by an ever-changing and expanding pool of adherents. This sentiment of ethno-religious primacy is the foremost truth of Malaysian politics, denial of which may prove fatal to any politically-driven program of social engineering. The new normal for growing cohorts of contemporary Malay-Muslims is inching towards somewhere in-between the archetypal liberal and conservative positions of the ideological spectrum — ‘liberal conservative’ swerving to the right or ‘conservative liberal’ leaning left.

PH dug its own grave by misreading the Malay-Muslim ground as being ready to go liberal full blast. Voices linked to the old order in the mainstream media warned PH early on to pay heed to the staying power of identity politics among the largely conservative Malays. The ethos of PH’s vision for a ‘New Malaysia’ was interpreted by many as uncompromisingly liberal-cum-secular and more non-Malay than Malay in character. Thus we should not be surprised at the Malay-Muslim silent revolt, which pollster Merdeka Centre warned since January was threatening PH’s hold in 122 Malay-majority seats.

So, where does Muhyiddin Yassin come in? Muhyiddin was reformist, albeit in a watered-down UMNO sense. He was sacked from the deputy prime minister post in 2015 for voicing his disapproval of former prime minister Najib Razak’s 1MDB shenanigans. While once proclaiming himself a Malay first and a Malaysian second, on other occasions he made known his opposition to Malay-centric racism.

Tellingly, his choice of ministers aroused criticism even from his former UMNO compatriots. Muhyiddin’s choice for Minister of the Prime Minister’s Department in charge of Islamic affairs, former mufti of the Federal Territories Zulkifli Mohamad al-Bakri, has ignited angst among Malay-Muslim conservatives.

Some commentators, unable to imagine how Muhyiddin could have gone against his own party chairman without the latter’s consent, felt that Muhyiddin was actually doing Mahathir’s bidding in thwarting Anwar Ibrahim’s bid for the prime ministership. At the same time, Muhyiddin saved Mahathir from the ignominy of having to go against his own promise of handing over the prime ministership to Anwar two years from May 2018, thus preserving Mahathir’s life-long project of creating a Malay bourgeoisie without interference from either UMNO’s corrupt ethnocrats or PH’s economic liberals.

While far from being a darling of the ‘New Malaysia’ cause, Muhyiddin should not be labelled a traitor to it either. His precarious position lies uncomfortably between the two polar liberal–conservative positions of the ideological spectrum. His motives for initiating the power grab remain speculation, but ironically it has shielded PH from bearing the brunt of popular discontent during the COVID-19 outbreak.

Ahmad Fauzi Abdul Hamid is Professor of Political Science, School of Distance Education, Universiti Sains Malaysia (USM).