[Analytics] Malaysia spins the revolving door of patronage politics

Former Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad listening to current Prime Minister Muhyiddin Yassin during a news conference, 5 April 2018 (Photos: Reuters/Lai Seng Sin). Sketched by the Pan Pacific Agency.

In May 2018, Malaysians defied the odds and voted out a United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) led government that had held office for 62 years. The regime clung to power by exploiting a doctrine of Malay–Islamic supremacy, harsh repression, targeted patronage to its rural-Malay base and manipulation of government institutions. John Funston specially for the East Asia Forum.

Voter anger focussed on the 1MDB scandal which involved the embezzlement of billions of dollars and was described by former US Attorney-General Jeff Sessions as ‘kleptocracy at its worst’. Yet less than two years later the old regime, now allied with extremist Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS), is back after Muhyiddin Yassin was appointed Prime Minister.

The Pakatan Harapan coalition had promised a ‘new Malaysia’ under an administration committed to democracy, human rights, economic reform and transparency. It was led by arch-rivals former prime minister Mahathir Mohamad and the deputy he jailed, Anwar Ibrahim.

They were brought together under an agreement that Mahathir would be prime minister for two years before Anwar, who was then in jail under trumped-up charges, gained a pardon and succeeded him. Anwar’s multiracial, reformist People’s Justice Party (PKR) and Mahathir’s Bersatu, a smaller Malay-only UMNO breakaway, joined with the predominantly Chinese Democratic Action Party (DAP), Amanah, a moderate breakaway from PAS, and Warisan, a small UMNO breakaway in Sabah.

What went wrong? The immediate cause was the willingness of factions within Bersatu and the PKR, led by Bersatu deputy leader Muhyiddin, to switch support. In the last week of February, shifting alliances and frantic lobbying finally gave the opposition enough parliamentarians for the King to appoint Muhyiddin.

Amid the conflict, Mahathir resigned as prime minister, hoping to be recalled as head of a unity government over which he would have absolute power. All sides rejected this and his realignment with Pakatan came too late.

The numbers commanded by the two groups were close, with Mahathir and Pakatan holding a small majority. This would normally have secured Mahathir the chance to form a new government. Muhyiddin’s eventual appointment was not in accord with Westminster traditions and reflects a worrying expansion of royal power. But it was unsurprising given UMNO’s close ties with royalty and Mahathir’s antagonistic relationship with the crown.

After a promising start, the Pakatan government soon lost its way. The early stages saw a slew of progressive reforms. Malaysians of integrity were appointed to key government offices. Legal action was taken against corrupt politicians. Human rights issues gained prominence and media freedom became a reality. There were shortcomings from the start, but these were forgiven in the euphoria of the moment.

In the face of a sustained campaign by UMNO and PAS to brand the government as being controlled by the DAP and an existential threat to the Malay race and Islam, Mahathir sought to appease rather than push back. Promises to sign the UN International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court were dropped after a hysterical campaign waged against them by UMNO, PAS and some royal families.

Mahathir sought numerous opportunities to demonstrate his Malay credentials, even presiding over a chauvinistic ‘Malay Dignity’ congress, linking hands with UMNO and PAS leaders. These policies alienated non-Malays, but were ineffective in countering the UMNO–PAS onslaught.

Mahathir also blocked progress on a wide range of legal, human rights and other reforms, declaring the Pakatan election manifesto unrealistic given he did not expect to win office. After abolishing the hated GST, even economic reform lost its momentum. Lower-income Malaysians saw no improvement in their well-being, and political uncertainties caused investors to hold back and the stock market to plunge.

Mahathir manoeuvred constantly to divide and rule his administration. This was mostly aimed at getting out of his pre-election commitment to transfer the prime ministership to Anwar within two years. He refused to nominate a date, and encouraged PKR Minister of Economic Affairs Azmin Ali, and leaders from Bersatu, UMNO and PAS, to support him in completing a full five-year term. Critical divisions within PKR, and occasional missteps by DAP leaders, helped Mahathir’s cause.

Lacking legitimacy and substantial personal support, alongside a sluggish economy now exacerbated by the coronavirus, and confronted by a strong opposition, Prime Minister Muhyiddin faces challenging times.

Still, some things look certain. First, while an immediate dropping of court cases against UMNO leaders is unlikely, UMNO will expect some consideration in this area.

Second, there will be less democratic space. When he served as the minister of Home Affairs, Muhyiddin was a law and order man. Already there has been heavy-handed police intervention against peaceful protests by investigating demonstrators under the Sedition Act.

Third, this will be a more overtly Malay Muslim government. Muhyiddin famously declared that he is a Malay first and Malaysian second, and his cabinet reflects this. Bersatu and UMNO dominate, including many from UMNO close to discredited former prime minister Najib Razak. PAS has been given an important portfolio in charge of parliamentary affairs and law. A top Islamic official has been appointed for the first time, with Mufti of the Federal Territories Zulkilfi Mohamad Al-Bakri elevated to Religious Affairs Minister. Almost 40 per cent of the population are non-Malays, but have only a small number of minor portfolios.

Muhyiddin has strengthened his position by appointing four coordinating ministers instead of a deputy prime minister, and giving key portfolios such as finance and home affairs to his own men. But he is deeply beholden to UMNO–PAS, and a weak Bersatu will be no match for its powerful allies in the longer term.

It will be some time before the full impact of these changes on the economy can be discerned. If the new government can achieve stability it could draw investors back, but much needed economic reforms are unlikely to occur. Having tasted success, reform efforts may regain momentum in the future, but for the moment, ‘Old Malaysia’ has out-manoeuvred ‘New Malaysia’.

John Funston is a Visiting Fellow in the Department of Political and Social Change, College of Asia and the Pacific, The Australian National University.

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